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Panel Discussion:
Role of High Risk Groups in Standard
Derivation
Michael D. Utidjian*
The recognition of high risk groups in the setting
of occupational standards in the United States re-
ally appears to date from the establishment of
OSHA of 1970 and the concomitant mandate for the
development of criteria for Federal occupational
exposure standards. Although the ACGIH recom-
mended threshold limit values (TLV's) had been
available as guidelines in increasing numbers since
shortly after World War II, and these TLV's re-
ceived legal endorsement by several individual
states, the declared intent ofthe TLV's has always
been to protect ""nearly all workers" from adverse
health effects. Explicit recognition is given to the
Preface to the ACGIH TLV booklet each year, to
the fact that "'a small percentage of workers may
experience discomfort from some substances at
concentrations at or below the threshold limit; a
smaller percentage may be affected more seriously
by aggravation of a pre-existing condition or by de-
velopment of an occupational illness." The preface
goes on to point out that hypersusceptibility to cer-
tain industrial chemicals (respiratory irritants,
hemolytic chemicals, organic isocyanates and car-
bon disulfide are cited as examples) can be detected
by readily available simple tests, and that such tests
'.... may be used to screen out by appropriate job
placement the hyperreactive worker..
In contrast, the philosophy behind the OSHA
Standards is to protect "all workers" from adverse
health effects over a working lifetime. Recognition
of the existence of hypersusceptible or high risk
groups with respect to certain chemical exposures
(and possibly physical agents also) must therefore
impact upon the development of standards which
are intended to protect all workers. Refuge in the
practice of screening out of hypersusceptibles from
a work force with potential exposures to any par-
ticular agent is no longer officially condoned,
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whether by preplacement tests or the commoner
and time-honored method of allowing self-selection
of the work force to take place with the passage of
time.
The concept of hypersusceptibility as here
applied is comprehensive and embraces such varied
factors as constitutional idiosyncrasy, acquired
immunologic hypersensitivity, genetically deter-
mined enzyme deficiency, the presence of predis-
posing chronic disease or impairment, age, sex, and
physiologic predisposition. I also feel that it should
include certain well-established life-style habits
such as cigarette smoking (with respect to most in-
haled carcinogens, especially asbestos) and heavy
consumption ofalcohol (with respect to carbon tet-
rachloride and possibly other hepatic toxicants).
One ofthe most clearcut and significant examples
of this impact, already discussed in this session, is
demonstrated by the basis of the recommended ex-
posure standard for carbon monoxide. In recogni-
tion ofthe greater risk ofadverse health effects run
by persons with either incipient or overt ischemic
heart disease and the high prevalence of this condi-
tion in the male working population, the NIOSH
Criteria Document for carbon monoxide recom-
mends a lowering ofthe present standard from 50 to
35 ppm as a time-weighted average. At the same
time, this document concedes that even this stan-
dard may not be fully protective of the ischemic
heart disease subject and therefore suggests coun-
seling of known sufferers that 'they may be at in-
creased risk from occupational exposure to carbon
monoxide." Now the Criteria Document for
methylene chloride recommends a lowering of the
standard from 200 ppm to 75 ppm as a TWA on the
basis of its partial biodegradation to carbon
monoxide in the human organism, and an attempt is
made to derive the methylene chloride standard
secondarily from the carbon monoxide standard al-
ready cited.
Another occupational standard of major signifi-
cance where the recommended lowering is at least
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proportion of the general population, variously es-
timated as from 20 to 30%, is that for sulfur dioxide.
Here the hypersusceptibility seems to be based not
on an incipient disease state but rather a prevalent
and inherent constitutional state of hyperreactivity
to the reflex bronchoconstrictor effect ofthe irritant
gas.
I now want to hand over this topic for discussion
by the panel by suggesting that perhaps the most
problematic issue ofall is the concept ofall females
of reproductive age as a high risk group, either di-
rectly or more plausibly as the potential bearers of
the undoubtedly hypersusceptible" embryo and
fetus. Also recent unpleasant discoveries of the
sterilizing propensities of DBCP and the suspicion
of EDB should remind us that spermatogonia as
well as ova may represent a high risk tissue.
Morton Corn*
It is appropriate that the final sessions of this
conference focus on standards, because standards
are the driving force of a regulatory effort, the dis-
tillation of whatever mechanisms for judgment of
risk are operative in a society. Standards are the
key to a future state of affairs if a society has seri-
ously embarked on a course ofeither governmental
or selfregulation ofoccupational and environmental
hazards. Although we are approaching the discus-
sion here on the basis of separation ofenvironmen-
tal and occupational hazards, the bulk of my re-
marks are applicable to both areas, but occupational
standards will be used by way of illustration. Also,
the following is in the context of U. S. regulatory
policy in occupational health and safety; much may
not translate to other societies, as will be evident.
Ours is a highly commercial, technologically ad-
vanced, legalistic country with a complex structure
of Federal, state and local government and a tradi-
tion of participatory government at all levels of
jurisdiction. Because standards reflect the coming
to terms of a society with the realities of that soci-
ety, we must not expect that standards will be di-
rectly translatable to other societies. We are cer-
tainly observing the symptom of nations adopting,
en masse, the occupational standards ofother, more
technologically advanced nations. It does not work;
at best, we observe large discrepancies between the
goals of the regulatory effort, as embodied in the
standards, and the reality of conditions in the in-
dustrial environment in those nations.
The word "standard" is here used in the sense of
a legally enforceable body of requirements which
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must be met by those in responsible charge of
workplaces. Because of the legal ramifications of
standards, the standard-setting process must result
in goals which are achievable by those legally
charged with meeting them. Failure to do this re-
sults in lack of confidence in the standards, those
drafting them and resistance to the enforcement
process. Where guidelines, which are not legally
binding, are involved, an entirely different set of
circumstances applies. The usual result of unrealis-
tic guidelines is that they are ignored by all con-
cerned. They remain a scholarly ideal having little
relationship to reality. Apparently, from all eyewit-
ness accounts, Russian guidelines for the concen-
trations of substances in workplace air fall into this
latter category.
Before presenting any views on the relationship
of occupational standards to high risk groups, per-
mit me to reiterate the ideas ofWilliam Lowrance in
his book, Of Acceptable Risk (W. Kaufman Inc.,
Los Altos, 1976). The control of occupational
hazards is an exercise in sorting out the risk as-
sociated with a particular agent or situation in rela-
tion to all the other risks we must accept as a part of
our daily lives. Lowrance made a major contribu-
tion by differentiating between risk assessment,
which is an empirical, scientific endeavor, and
judgment of risk, which is a normative political
exercise. In the U. S. it is the latter exercise which
now leads to the proposal for, and promulgation of
an occupational safety or health standard under the
provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.
Lowrance stresses that: "Safety is not measured;
risks are measured. Only when those risks are
weighed on the balance of social values can safety
be judged: a thing is safe if its attendant risks are
judged to be acceptable."
The mixing of these two activities, the assess-
ment ofrisk and thejudgment ofrisk in U. S. occu-
pational health standards setting processes since
1971, has been the cause of much of the bitterness
engendered in politically identifiable groups as-
sociated with occupational standards setting in the
U.S. The confusion ofthese two activities by those
charged with simple presentation of the regulatory
machinery, as well as by those intent upon achiev-
ing often parochial results related to a single stan-
dard affecting the work environment, has confused
the public and jeopardized the entire regulatory
process. Because data are often insufficient to per-
mit one to assess risk, the final recommendations of
each individual concerned is ajudgment of the ac-
ceptability of the risk and not a contribution to the
assessment of the risk. However, it has not been
couched in those terms in the formative steps of
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tional Safety and Health Agency has, in contrast,
taken pains on many occasions to separate risk as-
sessment fromjudgment ofthe acceptability ofrisk.
The following quotation from the Coke Oven Emis-
sions Standard illustrates the explicit nature of
judgment ofrisk acceptability, which was made and
which was sustained as reasonable and valid by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals when the standard
was challenged by the American Iron and Steel In-
stitute. "'OSHA has determined that 150,glem3 is
the level which most adequately assures, to the ex-
tent feasible, the protection of coke oven workers.
Several factors have been considered in making this
determination and are discussed below."
The judgment of the risk acceptability will be
challenged in the U.S. framework of government.
The judgment ofacceptability ofoccupational risks
is a controversial exercise in regulatory government
with often very expensive ramifications following
from the final judgments. In the case of the Coke
Oven Emissions Standard, the cost to the coking
industry was estimated to be $275 million per year.
Of course, these costs will be passed on to U.S.
citizens, but the differential impacts of these costs
to individual employers within an industry, and to
the industry in its international conduct ofbusiness
cannot be ignored; the impacts are real and they
stimulate intensive, sustained involvement ofthese
sectors in the rulemaking. When faced with judg-
ments which differ from those they would make if
they were the regulators, the private sector or or-
ganized labor becomes the aggrieved party and
presses for thejudgment of risk by a third, objective
party, i.e., the courts. OSHA undoubtedly still op-
erates on the assumption in force during my tenure
in office, namely, every standard will be challenged
in the courts. The ultimate, ironic proof of this as-
sumption may be the position taken by the AFL-
CIO in their opposition to the selective removal of
ineffective, nit-picking consensus safety standards
adopted in haste in the early life ofthe Agency and
responsible for so much loss of Agency credibility,
good will, and effectiveness. Certainly, OSHA did
not anticipate that organized labor would be a
grieved party in this endeavor.
With this introduction to risk assessment and
judgment, we can now proceed to the process of
standard setting in the U.S. The Congress in its
wisdom intended, I believe; to separate risk as-
sessment and risk judgment in the OSHA of 1970.
NIOSH was to assess risk and OSHA in the stan-
dards setting process was to reflect the wishes of
the body politic injudging the risk. The process was
to be an open one with the widest possible partici-
pation of all in our society. In my opinion, the
judgment of risk process has been open and, al-
though hectic, has adhered to the aims of the Act.
The risk assessment role assigned to NIOSH has
not been satisfactorily performed. Research to gen-
erate the kinds ofdata needed to assess risk has not
been stimulated or performed by the Institute. The
criteria documents are citational reviews ofexisting
information, seldom with a critical perspective, and
never place the relative risk ofthe agent in perspec-
tive. The weaknesses of criteria documents has re-
sulted in the mixing of risk assessment and judg-
ment activities in the OSHA rulemaking process,
making a difficult process of administrative
rulemaking even more difficult!
The above discussion was an essential one to the
position I now take. The majority ofus are high risk
individuals at work, in one sense or another during
our lifetimes. Table 1 is part of the data cumulated
by the American Public Health Association in their
volume entitled, Health and Work in America: A
Chart Book (APHA, Washington, D. C., 1975,
p. 63). The topic we are discussing at this Confer-
ence is management of the conditions of work so
that individuals are not stressed in a way that viol-
ates the best principles ofpreventive medicine. The
question is how do we place and monitor individuals
in work environments so that a risk judged to be
unacceptable to that individual is not encountered.
Table 1. Currently employed persons with selected chronic conditions, by occupation: 19691972.a
Rate/1000 persons/year
White Blue Total
Condition collar collar Service Farm all occupations
Arthritis (1969) 82.6 87.5 132.2 162.4 92.6
Chronic bronchitis (1970) 26.3 21.3 29.0 21.3 24.6
Impairment of back or spine (1971) 52.9 55.5 53.7 79.0 54.6
Heart condition (1972) 44.9 32.3 43.9 46.0 41.4
Hypertensive disease (1972) 64.5 61.6 93.8 63.5 67.1
a Calculated from unpublished data from the Health Interview Survey, National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Rockville, MD.
April 1979 163Can our standards act as a template for such man-
agement through medical and environmental sur-
veillance, administrative and engineering controls,
etc.? Can we build in surveillance methods that will
identify those at high risk and can we devise ad-
ministrative procedures acceptable to all concerned
that reduce this risk? The issue of rate retention is
an example of the latter procedures.
Figure 1 illustrates some guiding principles both
in the assessment ofrisk and in thejudgment ofrisk
procedures. The graph is attributable to my pre-
decessor at Pitt, Professor Theodore Hatch [Am.
Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 23:1 (1962)]:
"In Figure 1 a distinction is made between impairment
and disability, the two scales representing, respectively, the
underlying disturbance of the system and the consequence
of such disturbance in terms ofidentifiable disease. Starting
with normal health, the individual progresses, forone reason
or another, along the scale of impairment and of disability,
ultimately to death. Early departures from health (impair-
ment) are accompanied by little disability. In the beginning,
normal homeostatic processes insure adequate adjustment
to offset stress and for a distance beyond this early zone of
change, compensatory processes similarly maintain the
overall function of the system without serious disability.
Further increments in impairment beyond the limits ofcom-
pensatory processes, however, are accompanied by rapidly
increasing increments in disability and the individual moves
into the region of sickness and disability; terminating in
death. A healthy individual, functioning at point A on the
curve and subjected to agiven kind and degree ofstress may
respond with relatively minor and temporary disturbance
and will return to his underlying position when the stress is
removed. An individual at point B, on the other hand, may
find the same kind and degree of stress intolerable and, in
consequence, move rapidly up the curve to a position of
serious disability and even death. In our past concern with
occupational diseases, relationships were established be-
tween conditions of exposure and degrees of disability and
objectives were to bring the stresses ofthejob within limits
to prevent such disability. For the future, concern must be
with impairment, rather than disability, and relationships
have to be demonstrated between the stresses ofthejob and
the more subtle disturbances. The degree of impairment
must be kept within limits well below the level ofdisease."
Much of this Conference has focused on mea-
sures ofimpairment at work and it is proper that this
be done. This is part of the scientific base for
measuring risk. When all ofthese data are put forth
before the regulatory body charged with standard
setting, they should be placed in as clear a perspec-
tive as possible. There is no certainty in these areas.
The perception andjudgment ofacceptable risk, be
it at the level of impairment, the trend of today, or
disability, the focus of the past, is constantly alter-
ing, as was so beautifully summarized by my wife,
Jacqueline, in a published paper entitled, Historical
Perspective to a Current Controversy on the Clini-
cal Spectrum ofPlumbism" (J. K. Corn, Health and
Society MMFQ, Winter 1975, p. 111):
NORMAL
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FIGURE 1. Suggested relationship between impairment and disa-
bility. Impairment increases with aging, as a residual of ill-
ness, and from excessive environmental stress.
"The significance of the history of plumbism up to this
point is that an ancient disease once considered acceptable
has been re-evaluated and become a serious medical,
human, and social problem. This change offocus is based on
new scientific data which have changed our perceptions of
the earlier manifestations of lead poisoning on the health of
industrial workers and the general population exposed to
lead.
'"The new uses oflead, new ability to make more accurate
measurements, advances in biochemical science, and new
attitudes towards the public health have all meshed to chal-
lenge the traditional concept of lead poisoning. In the
dialogue that has been initiated between those who see a
threat and those who do not, the concept of health risk and
even the concept of disease itself are undergoing redefini-
tion."
In other words, it is imperative to place all the
available data related to risk in clear perspective.
These data must relate to all the indicators as-
sociated with perception of risk and to the best of
our ability to do so, the quantitation ofthe risk. All
of us recognize that the data base in occupational
health will have more omissions than inclusions for
many years, because we all know the approximate
agenda demanding regulation. But inadequate as it
is, this is the procedure we must follow prior to
judging the risk.
Ifthe above argument is accepted, it is not possi-
ble to indicate, in any givenjudgment ofa standard,
which criteria should be adhered to by the regulat-
ory agency. This is because there are some real
constraints in the world and they must be factored
into the consideration under discussion. The con-
straints I refer to are the following.
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164TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY. There are limits to
technology. In many cases we are quite knowledge-
able about the capability for exisiting engineering
controls to limit exposure of workers to chemicals.
Technology can be forced incrementally beyond
these limits, but I believe it to be irresponsible for a
regulatory agency such as OSHA to set an airborne
standard for a chemical when it has no indication
that the airborne concentration is achievable in
practice. A regulatee would be well advised to seek
third party review of a standard which asks him or
her to do the impossible. I say this, recognizing that
there will be risk to workers associated with the
airborne exposure concentration associated with
'best available control technology" (BACT). In
these cases, one must invoke other, albeit less ef-
fective, methods for achieving lower exposures,
i.e., personal protective equipment, administrative
controls such asjob rotation, etc. These procedures
do not 'freeze technology," as some have stated. It
is always possible within our regulatory framework
to revise the control strategy at some future date,
once again through due process, to reduce the risk
by the more direct avenue of BACT, when en-
gineering advances applicable to the situation have
occurred.
COSTS OF CONTROL. I have always believed it
unrealistic and irresponsible to attempt to avoid
preparation of cost figures for implementation of
control efforts following from OSHA standards ac-
tivity. Part ofthejudgment ofrisk is the weighing of
the costs to reduce the risk. There is very little in
our lives that does not have to withstand examina-
tion following from the question 'What will it
cost?" The irrelevance ofthe argument against cost
considerations can be reduced to absurdity by
placing a hypothetical dollar figure of $20 billion/
year on control costs for coke oven emissions.
Would OSHA have promulgated the standard it
promulgated under these conditions? Ofcourse not.
The Agency would have lost all credibility if it did
so. Thus, there is a factoring in of dollars to risk
judgment and it is foolish to argue that the wording
of the OSHA of 1970 is in conflict with the consid-
eration ofcosts ofimplementation. The argument is
contrary to all our experiences. It will not hold up.
Recent events related to the OSHA Cotton Dust
Standard reaffirm the close coupling of dollar costs
and data for scientific benefits to be achieved in the
OSHA regulatory framework. The intimate con-
nection between dollars and regulatory actions has
been affirmed by the OSH Review Commission and
the Courts. It is time to place these data for costs in
as clear a perspective as possible, to accept their
relevance to the act ofjudging risks and to focus on
makingjudgments which will withstand scrutiny on
the basis of their judicious weighing of all relevant
data.
I say this, fully cognizant of the argument that
those who take the risks are not those who get the
benefits. By building methods into reduction of risk
which avoid the endpoints of disease or traumatic
injury, namely, surveillance for early detection of
impairment offunction, use of methods short ofen-
gineering controls, management of susceptible per-
sons with assurance of continued employment if
removal from high riskjobs are necessary, effective
control of risk and achievement of the goals of the
OSHA of 1970 can be achieved. It was my observa-
tion that those individuals most vehement in their
support ofrigid positions to achieve the goals ofthe
Act were often those least understanding ofthe sci-
entific basis fortoxicological action or control ofthe
agents addressed in the standards. They were wed-
ded to political postures independent of the data
base and would, in the name of social progress,
guide the Agency to unsupportable positions during
the process of third party review.
In summary, I cannot offer a panacea consisting
of rigid guidelines for incorporation of high risk
group considerations into standards. All of the sci-
entific data related to the risk undergoing assess-
ment should be clearly stated; risk should then be
stated in as many ways as possible in order to
facilitate the judgment of risk by the regulatory
body. I believe the generation of data for risk as-
sessment must undergo quantum improvement in
the near future; we are already regulating with a
very slim data base. It is preferable, I believe, for
separate bodies to do risk assessment and risk
judgment, but this is not how we are currently ap-
proaching the matter. Only the rejuvenation of
NIOSH will alter our current approach. The sub-
jects of this conference are highly relevant to the
data base because each of us, during our working
lifetime, is at high risk in one regard or another. If
thejudgment ofrisk were my responsibility I would
desire to see all available data, including cost data
forcontrol ofrisk to different levels. In the presence
of these data, one can hope that judgment of risk
would be defensible at some future date.
Finally, in certain cases where data are absolutely
lacking, regulators must erron the side ofprudence.
This represents judgment of a real risk, but one
which cannot be quantitated. Often suchjudgments
are upheld because members of a society share a
common perception ofthe risk. I believe the risk of
cancer in our society is currently in this class of
risks. We have in the past, and will probably in the
future, judged all risks associated with cancer to be
subject to some degree of control. Because the
April 1979 165data bases are often equivocal and the political fac-
tors are so significant, thejudgments ofrisk appear
illogical. Examples to contrast are that of cigarette
smoke and saccharin control measures. Current
control measures are roughly equivalent in the face
of vastly different risks. The only unifying factor
appears to be their vastly different potential to in-
duce cancer. Society feedback did not sustain ban-
ning of saccharin, but it is endorsing appropriate
labelling. The judgment of the risk of cigarette
smoking is consonant with actions of mild labelling
because it appears that society will not sustain more
forceful action. These two cases clearly illustrate
how the activities of assessment of risk and judg-
ment ofrisk differ. In summary, one might say that
regulators in theirjudgment of risk activity attempt
to determine what "'the traffic will bear" at a given
point in time when action must be taken.
Bertram Dinman*
If we are interested in solving problems-and I
suppose that's why we are all here, I think we can
agree with one proposition, namely, in setting stan-
dards, one should attempt to set standards which
are effective, prudent and feasible. Otherwise, we
are faced with an inexorable law ofpolitical science
which states that laws which are unrealistic are in-
effectual. I think a good case in point ofcourse was
the Volstead Act, the so-called "'great experiment."
This is my point of departure on the continuum of
logic, which, if you carefully follow, eventually
comes full circle back to that conclusion.
As regards risk assessment and safety or risk
judgment, it is important to differentiate between
these two elements. William Lowrance (OfAccept-
able Risk, W. Kaufman, Inc., Los Altos, Calif.
1976) has made a singular contribution to our ap-
preciation of how society can rationally cope with
the reality ofrisk, since risk is a reality ofeveryday
life. It is important to differentiate clearly between
risk assessment, which is quantifiable, which is sci-
entific, which is empirical or data-based judgment.
That stands in marked contrast to risk or safety
judgment, which is a normative, political exercise in
judgment in order to determine how much risk or
safety is acceptable to society, and particularly to
those who must face these risks, and ultimately ac-
ceptability, in its turn, is a function ofcost, whether
we wish to admit it or not. It is also a function of
relative risk, i.e., compared to what? There is also a
question as to who is to take the risk, as well as the
need for reflection as to who is to benefit from a
risk. In safety judgment these variables must be
factored in.
* Alcoa.
First, with regard to risk assessment, I quite
agree with Dr. Kotin that more clarity ofthought is
needed regarding the terms we use in this area of
risk assessment; assessment, in part, revolves
about detecting and understanding change, par-
ticularly where biological change is the focus. I've
spoken to this question in an article (Science 175:
495 1972) which I still believe is relevant. Although
we are increasing our capabilities to detect changes
or even effects in dose-effect relationship at the
microgram, nanogram, picogram, femogram range
(i.e., as low as 10-'5g). I think one has to be very
careful as to what one means by effect or response.
Going to Webster's International Dictionary, the
English Language, Unabridged, I find the following:
"'an effect is something that is produced by an agent
or cause, something that follows immediately from
an antecedent." Similarly, the definition of re-
sponse as in "dose-response" relationship, is "ac-
tivity or inhibition of previous activity of an or-
ganism." In sum, effect or response both represent
change without reference to whether this change is
good, bad or indifferent. Curiously, in contrast to
these neutral applications, somehow change per se,
or response, or effect have come to be equated with
"'bad" or "deleterious." I do not find that to be a
definitional actuality. And even without consider-
ing, even significantly, biology or statistics or com-
munication theory, I cannot necessarily agree that
effect or response is deleterious per se.
What is the basis for my position? It has been
long known by physiologists that a living and viable,
particularly with the emphasis upon "viable," or-
ganism or organ is functioning when it changes its
state, responds to a stress. Indeed, it is clearly a
necessity for that organ to do so unless we remain in
a state of total environmental ablation. I have only
to refer to experiments in total sensory deprivation
and the devastating effect it has upon organismal
function. Certainly the value and current percep-
tions of the value of placing graded stress on the
heart and producing an effect or a response is sci-
entifically and physiologically seen as nondeleteri-
ous, indeed, it is presumably seen as beneficial. In
contrast, the well accepted value ofsuch exercise, I
find a curious dichotomy, i.e., any effect which is
measured in bio-chemical terms, is not frequently
seen as deleterious per se. For example, consider
changes in 8-ALA dehydratase activity with lead
exposure. That such a response might just as well
be in the range of homeostasis appears unaccepta-
ble to many at this particular point in time. I wonder
ifthis is not a reflection ofPavlovian biology. How-
ever, I would point out that even Senotsky is begin-
ning to shift away from the concept that a change is
Environmental Health Perspectives 166deleterious per se, in terms of reference of Pavlo-
vian biology. I believe here is the problem, here is
the crux, that risk assessment needs more thought
and data; such thought is exemplified by Mort
Corn's quote ofProfessor Hatch, especially to point
is his emphasis on impairment which he defined as a
departure from health, and I would agree with that.
The dictionary states "impair is to do harm, do
damage." Yet, when I discussed with him and with
Professor Hatch over the years where harm or im-
pairment lies on this curve of response, there is dif-
ficulty agreeing where homeostasis ends and when
impairment begins.
So here we are back again to where we started: Is
change within homeostatic limits deleterious per se?
Rather than speculate, I believe a wealth of intel-
lectual and societal challenge lie in this area. We do
need more work here. I think another associated
question that has to be answered is, "what are the
long-term health implications of homeostatic
change?" This gets to the heart of what we are re-
ally concerned with, i.e., the health implications of
stressors, chemical or physical, on biochemical
systems.
Still another question asks, "where is the dividing
line between homeostasis and adaptation;" and we
haven't heard the word adaptation as Clarence
Cannon defined it, nor as Clarence Cannon de-
scribed homeostasis sixty years ago. For indeed,
there is a difference between adaptation and
homeostasis, and I think this comes close to the
questions we were bringing up at this moment.
Now, so much for risk assessment. As regards
risk or safety judgment, remember this is a norma-
tive, political decision. Ultimately, societal deci-
sions will hinge on an equation which factors in the
following:
(1) Relative Risk. By this I indicate that a risk has
meaning only as compared to what other risks do
we willingly dare? And assuredly these start from
the moment ourfeet touch the floor in the morning.
(2) what is the uncertainty in the assessment pro-
cess?
(3) What are the benefits of the risk, particularly
to those taking it and to their community? I don't
mean just their community at large, I mean their
own family.
(4) What is the acceptability, again to those taking
the risk?
It is difficult to perceive as to the interaction of
these four elements and their relative weightings. I
would say on the basis of my own experience, that
solution of this complex equation will be underta-
ken by society or of the people involved. Let me
give you my basis for this position. In 1972 the
aluminum industry association commissioned a
study of the mortality experience of smelter work-
ers. Preliminary results of that study indicated that
there was a somewhat increased risk, SMR's of ap-
proximately 150 (100 being the expected) for lung
cancer in certain types of operations. At that point
in time, management and the union agreedjointly to
(1) lay out the risks for all the people involved; (2)
get more definitive determination of risk as soon as
possible; and (3) management indicated how they
would protect both in the short and long term. Now
with this threatening finding one would have ex-
pected considerable fear and dismay when the an-
nouncement was made. I must say I was somewhat
surprised at the minor impact that news made. But
with a little thought, it became clear to me that the
affected employees were indeed carrying out their
individual analyses of these difficult variables and
their interactions. The experience also reassured
me, as regards the common sense of our workers
when given the facts, in contrast to some of the
juvenile stridency of the self-appointed advocates.
From the practical problem solving point ofview,
I believe that representatives in the Joint Safety and
Health Activity at each plant we can solve these
problems. First of all, we've found we can work
together to meet a mutual goal which is protection
of safety and health of our workers. For there are
prudent tradeoffs there. There's no way to negotiate
away health. No increment of hourly rate can buy
health. We had no problem, both management and
labor, agreeing to this. Secondly, we are all faced
with economic and competitive reality, and it is im-
possible to provide absolute protection. No one is
asking for absolute protection. A categorical im-
perative, a total 100% guarantee for protection of
'.everyone" is just not attainable. Now in human
history, aside from two hillside speeches-I speak
ofthose which took place on the slopes of Mt. Sinai
and on a mount overlooking the Galilee-I find very
few categorical imperative constructs which have
held up. The reality ofthis observation is confirmed
by noting that, despite the fact that the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act states that all workers
are to be protected, I do know that most of the
congressmen and bureaucrats in Washington re-
turning home to northern Virginia take the bridge to
cross over the Potomac. It neither parts for their
passage, nor can they walk on it dry shod.
Suffice to say, dealing with this mutual problem
we have an option. We can enter the adversarial
arena to solve our problem, or we can work toward
solutions of problems by mutual information,
mutual respect, and mutual negotiation. I would
hold that the problems we have been discussing at
this conference could soon, be solved in this fash-
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would engage more professionals, because even
though I am trying to give my best version ofwhat I
believe is true, I would be much more comfortable if
on the other side ofthe table as far as this particular
area is concerned, labor had its competent rep-
resentatives. When Dr. Lloyd left the Steel Work-
ers I was very disappointed. I'm still glad to see that
Mike Wright is here, but I would like to see more
professionals like Lou Beliscy who is supposed to
be on the panel.
I hope I have touched on those elements which
define where I have been coming from as far as
operational realities as regards to the problems as-
sociated with standards intended to protect the
health of the workers.
Peter F. Infantel
I would like to comment on Dr. Corn's presenta-
tion and then make a few general comments. Dr.
Corn had mentioned the desire to promulgate less
controversial safety standards. Unfortunately, I be-
lieve that as long as there are special interest groups
who introduce the concept ofeconomics into scien-
tific debate, there will be no opportunity for a sci-
entific basis upon which risk assessment can be
made. Under these conditions for risk assessment,
science and economics always will be in conflict. As
such, pretesting of chemicals prior to their intro-
duction into the workplace is needed because, once
the chemical is in commerce, it is too expensive for
some to remove the exposure and it is too expensive
for others not to have the exposure removed.
In terms of risk assessment, a few weeks ago I
met with a group ofscientists to determine the types
of studies and the data required to indicate that a
chemical poses a potential mutagenic risk to hu-
mans. Some members of the group made recom-
mendations that certain tests were adequate if a
chemical was not in commercial use. But, if a
chemical was in commercial use, another set of
criteria should be used to determine potential
mutagenic risks. The rationale in the latter case
being that if the compound was in commercial use,
it may cost too much to eliminate the chemical from
commerce, and therefore more tests should be re-
quired. One ofthese recommended tests would pre-
sumably take several years to complete, i.e., the
specific locus test. I think this shows the problem of
scientists confusing scientific judgment with
economic considerations. If we're talking about a
scientific assessment of data, we should not be
doing what the economists seem to have difficulty
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doing many times, i.e., economic risk assessment.
Dr. Corn also mentioned that standards are the
key to a future state of affairs if a society has seri-
ously embarked on a course ofeither governmental
or self-regulation of occupational and environmen-
tal hazards. I certainly agree. Unfortunately, his-
torical accounting would indicate that society, at
least in the past, has not seriously regulated or con-
trolled environmental hazards. This is obvious from
the crises we've had in the past, that surface each
year and that continue to become manifest. For
example, with regard to benzidine, there were indi-
cations that this agent was carcinogenic as far back
as 1895, when workers employed in a dye man-
ufacturing plant had developed bladder cancer.
Since that time there were epidemiologic studies up
into the 1950's repeatedly indicating that benzidine
was associated with bladder cancer and in some
populations as high as 23%. For a population of
workers in Italy exposed to benzidine and 8-
naphthylamine, almost 100% reportedly had de-
veloped bladder cancer, yet benzidine was not con-
trolled as a carcinogen in the occupational setting in
the U. S. until 1973. Benzene is another example of
the long latency period between the identification of
a risk and the implementation ofadequate industrial
engineering controls. Before the turn ofthe century,
there were case reports indicating blood dyscrasias
associated with exposure to benzene. In 1928, a
case ofbenzene-related leukemia was first reported.
Case report after case report throughout the world,
wherever this material has been used, has indicated
leukemia associated with benzene exposure in the
occupational setting. Still, to this day, there is not
adequate control of benzene in the U. S. in the oc-
cupational setting. Benzene also serves as a good
example of an agent for which there is hypersus-
ceptibility. As a clinical example, Dr. Aksoy tes-
tified at the OSHA hearings on benzene that he was
aware of one worker who dipped whistles in ben-
zene for 17 years and had no apparent adverse
hematopoetic effects. His wife took the same job,
and after four months ofworking alongside her hus-
band, she had developed aplastic anemia with se-
vere bone marrow degeneration. So, while certainly
there is variability in response to toxic materials,
the question of identifying the hypersusceptible
group remains difficult, if not impossible.
In his presentation, Dr. Corn also mentioned that
we're certainly observing the symptoms of nations
adopting en masse the occupational standards of
other more technologically advanced nations.
Perhaps he could clarify that statement. I think
there are problems with the international transport
of toxic materials. At the meeting of fibrous and
particulate matter held by the Society for Occupa-
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Washington, slides were shown of an American-
owned facility just across the border into Mexico.
Small children were peering through a fence that
was entirely covered with asbestos fibers. If such
exposure to a potent carcinogen is not acceptable in
the United States, I would certainly hope that when
an American-owned industry goes abroad, it would
maintain adequate standards of safety and health.
Of course we know this is not the case in the de-
veloping countries.
Dr. Corn also stated "safety is not measured:
risks are measured. Only when those risks are
weighed on the balance ofsocietal values can safety
be judged. A thing is safe if its attendant risks are
judged to be acceptable." Now, I don't know that I
can agree with the philosophy that a thing is safe if
its attendant risks are judged acceptable, since
these are, in many cases, societal, not scientific de-
cisions. Perhaps we needlessly live with increased
health risks because ofa massive denial complex in
the industrialized countries. When technological
development is responsible for environmental in-
sult, we have difficulty accepting that we have met
the enemy and they are us. I don't think a toxic
material should ever be considered safe. For exam-
ple, when a standard of I ppm was established for
vinyl chloride, it was never intended as a safe expo-
sure, but rather an occupational exposure level that
was agreed upon on the basis ofengineering costs. I
think it is of concern that Dr. Maltoni has recently
induced mammary carcinomas with vinyl chloride
at levels of I ppm and he indicates a dose response.
Now, in terms of cost benefit and controversy, I
think that vinyl chloride also serves as an example
ofthe case in which there were many claims that the
prices of plastic were going to skyrocket, plants
would close, and numerous workers would be out of
jobs; that simply didn't happen. I think there were
very few plants that closed, approximately three
polymerization facilities, give or take one or two,
and most of these facilities were obsolete, having
been built in the late thirties or early forties.
In terms of identifying populations at high risk to
environmental chemicals, industry does select
workers who are initially relatively healthy in com-
parison to the general population. This phenomenon
has been demonstrated by mortality patterns from
epidemiologic cohort studies, and is referred to as
the 'healthy worker effect." For example, if you
calculate total mortality for workers within a period
of 10-15 years since onset ofemployment and com-
pare mortality experience to an age, sex, race, and
calendar time-period adjusted standard population,
a deficit in mortality will be observed. This is be-
cause the industrial cohort is compared to the gen-
eral population consisting of people who are rela-
tively less employable due to various illnesses or
chronic disabling conditions. However, after 20-25
years since onset of employment, this same group,
rather than having a deficit of mortality, has an in-
creased risk of mortality as compared to a standard
population. So, relatively healthy workers are
selected but nevertheless, workers are still at a
greater risk of disease from exposures occurring in
the occupational setting. In further regard to
screening out hypersusceptible workers, how can
workers be selected for an occupational exposure
that demonstrates, as mentioned earlier, that almost
100% of the workers developed bladder cancer in a
single plant.
Since there has been considerable discussion
today about asbestos, it should be mentioned that
recent estimates indicate several thousand cancer
deaths a year in the United States will be attributed
to asbestos exposure, alone. Since we've been dis-
cussing smoking and lung cancer, recent estimates
also indicate that more than 20% of the increase in
lung cancer in the past twenty years cannot be at-
tributed to smoking. Likewise, recent studies indi-
cate a 5- to 15-fold excessive risk of lung cancer in
asbestos workers who do not smoke. In the past few
years there has been a preoccupation with concern
for an overcontrol of toxic materials. There is sim-
ply no basis for this concern. as an historical ac-
counting, at least for carcinogens, demonstrates a
devastating legacy in terms oftoll on workers in the
United States. This post hoc accounting can be
demonstrated by the fact that we have been re-
quired to do epidemiological enumeration ofthe toll
before regulation of any agent as a carcinogen.
In terms of genetic factors, we heard a presenta-
tion by Dr. Kilian indicating cytogenetic screening
programs to determine whether there ar-e any ad-
verse effects in genetic material at the commence-
ment of employment as indicated by the study of
chromosomal damage in circulating lymphocytes. If
such a screening program is used for hiring. for
placing employees where they may not be exposed
to chemicals that have known toxic effects. or to
evaluate the effects of exposure to heretofore un-
known potentially toxic materials, what happens if
one later identifies an excess ofchromosomal daim-
age attributed to these employees occupational ex-
posure to specific chemicals such as benzene or
epichlorohydrin'? What is the public health practice.
or the medical implementation of the knowledge
gained when such periodic screening programs de-
tect hazards for which they were initially designed'?
What is the responsibility to the workers in this
situation'? Are the atmospheric exposure levels re-
duced'? Are workers with elevated numbers of
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areas ofbenzene or epichlorohydrin exposure'? Are
they counseled in terms ofgenetic risks that may be
potentially a problem if they are planning to pro-
create? Are they counseled in terms ofsomatic cell
damage? These are questions that need to be ad-
dressed by any responsible organization, be it cor-
porate, labor, or government.
Likewise, when assessing differential risk by sex,
there are corporations that selectively do not ex-
pose women to various chemicals with no adequate
scientific evidence that these chemicals selectively
have an adverse effect on the developing embryo or
fetus and not on male germinal tissue. Occupational
health practice needs to be based on sound scien-
tific data. Well designed studies to assess transpla-
cental effects as well as to assess mutagenic and
carcinogenic effects are needed. Otherwise, if
women are excluded from exposure to specific in-
dustrial agents and men are allowed to sustain high
level exposure to carcinogens and mutagens, a
transferring of potential risks to the fetus and to
subsequent generations through a different
mechanism may be the result. We also may be
transferring somatic cell damage from women to
men, while women are presently outliving their
male counterparts by 7 to 8 years.
In addition to the usual problems in the work-
place and the vast number of toxic materials not
adequately controlled, there has been a major crisis
identified during each year of the past four years.
Since this is a conference on increased susceptibil-
ity, I point up some of these adverse health situa-
tions as examples of different end-points manifest-
ing a toxic response of chemical to workers. In
1974, vinyl chloride was demonstrated to cause
cancer ofthe liver, lung, brain, and more recently to
the lymphatic system in workers occupationally ex-
posed to this toxic material. In 1975, the chlorinated
hydrocarbon pesticide, kepone, was found to cause
neurologic disorders in workers. In 1976, the or-
ganophosphate pesticide, leptophos, was found to
cause delayed neurotoxicity in pesticide for-
mulators. In 1977, an agricultural nematocide, di-
bromochloropropane, was found to cause sterility
in workers in the pesticide industry. It is extremely
important to identify individuals with increased
susceptibility to disease from exposure to specific
chemicals or work environs. However, it should be
kept in mind how few endpoints in clinical disease
can actually be predicted with the present state of
knowledge. Workers are exposed simultaneously to
multiple chemicals and numerous endpoints in
clinical disease manifestation are possible. Thus,
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with regard to a specific individual in the occupa-
tional setting, it would seem difficult to determine
whether he or she would or would not be at an
increased risk of disease when only one specific
organ is evaluated in relation to one exposure vari-
able at a time. This is particularly so as information
indicates multiple organs can be affected as a result
of exposure to a specific chemical. For example.
even ifadequate liver function tests could predict a
relatively greater susceptibility for the hepatotoxic
effects of vinyl chloride, cancer of the lung, brain,
and lymphatic system as well as other adverse ef-
fects to most organ systems have been demon-
strated. Therefore, the only effective medical
screening program for hypersusceptible individuals
would be one that would necessarily address
simultaneously all organs systems. However, it
would be more economically feasible to control oc-
cupational exposure than to adversely impact on an
already overburdened health care delivery system
in the United States.
Peggy SeminarioX
I have a few comments on Dr. Corn's paper and a
few comments of my own on occupational health
standards for high risk populations. Dr. Corn stated
in his paper that all individuals can be identified as
high risk individuals at one point in life for one risk
factor or another. I would agree with Dr. Corn that,
in speaking of high risk populations in a general
sense, we are in fact talking about significant num-
bers ofindividuals who may be at increased risk for
a variety of different factors, whether it be sex,
socioeconomic factors, or genetic factors. I would
like to say that I believe that standards which fail to
protect susceptible individuals are legally untenable
for several reasons. Occupational health standards
set at levels which fail to protect segments of the
population who are at increased risks, would re-
quire the exclusion of these individuals from select
jobs in the workplace. As we have seen in the lead
industry and are beginning to see in the chemical
industry, standards set at levels insufficient to pro-
tect the fetus have resulted in the blanket exclusion
of all women of childbearing age from the work-
place. These are policies and employment practices
which are contrary to the requirements for equal
employment opportunity and nondiscrimination set
forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. I don't
think that we can talk about the screening of work-
ers at high risk without talking about discrimination.
I think that it is essential that occupational health
standards for protecting workers be consistent with
policies for equal employment opportunity. Fur-
ther, as Dr. Dinman pointed out, it is the mandate of
Environmental Health Perspectives 170the OSHA Act that health standards be set at the
levels, to the extent feasible, that no worker suffer
loss of function or material impairment. The Act
also guarantees that all workers have a right to a
safe and healthful place of employment. Note, the
Act specifically guarantees protection to all work-
ers, and not just nonsusceptible individuals. To
date, most standards that have been set, have been
set for carcinogens and the present activity of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in-
dicates that we can expect that standards for the
control and regulation of carcinogens will continue
to be a priority. For those substances which are
carcinogens, we cannot guarantee safety even for
those who are considered not susceptible. Forthose
substances, we really cannot talk about the protec-
tion of susceptible workers, but rather we have to
talk about the protection of all workers. Standards
mustbe set at the level which, to the extentfeasible,
will assure the protection of all workers, and not
just the nonsusceptible individuals. Dr. Corn has
spent a considerable deal oftime this afternoon ad-
dressing the subject of acceptable risk, trying to
clear up some of the confusion regarding the sub-
ject. We have also heard remarks from other indi-
viduals on the concept ofacceptable risks, pointing
out that we do not live in a risk-free environment,
and we cannot expect control to zero exposure
levels in the workplace. Thus, it is argued that we
must set standards at a level which reflects the level
of risk which is acceptable to society. I would like
to ask, how do we make thosejudgments as to what
is socially acceptable? Further, these are levels
which are socially acceptable to whom-the
worker, who must accept the risk, or the employer
who believes that the further reduction in exposure
is too expensive to warrant the additional cost? I
think the fundamental question is, who is to bearthe
cost? Is it the individual worker who may suffer
impairment or disability or be unable to work in
certainjobs, because exposures are too high? Or is
the cost to be borne by the employer who has the
legal responsibility to protect the worker? In con-
sidering socially acceptable risks and the cost of
regulation, I think it's important for all ofus to look
at the costs of not regulating, the costs of non-
compliance medical care such as disability benefits,
workers' compensation costs, years of productive
work that are lost. Only with consideration ofthese
factors which are also true costs (i.e., the cost of
noncompliance, the cost that will be borne by indi-
viduals and ultimately by society through tax bur-
dens), can the true costs of regulation and non-
regulation be assessed. To put the costs of non-
compliance into realistic perspective for at least one
hazard, we only have to look at the yearly expen-
ditures of half a billion dollars for black lung com-
pensation paid to coal miners suffering from coal
workers' pneumoconiosis. In addition to the per-
missible exposure levels set in health standards, I
think other provisions of health standards are very
important with respect to susceptible workers.
Perhaps most important are the medical surveil-
lance components ofoccupational safety and health
standards. It is fair to say that, whether a worker is
normal or hypersusceptible, there is a fear that the
results ofmedical exams may be used in such a way
that it may mean eitherjob loss or loss of earnings
for the impacted worker. Workers fearing eitherjob
loss oreconomic impact may refuse to participate in
medical exams, exams which are clearly important
for the protection of workers' health. And for
hypersusceptible workers who may be screened out
by the identification of an objective factor, I think
the unwillingness to participate in such exams may
be significant. Forthose workers who do participate
in exams either by choice or by company policy,
fear ofjob loss may cause individuals to withhold
information on symptoms and health problems that
need medical attention. For many years, the labor
movement has fought very hard for the inclusion of
earnings protection provisions in OSHA health
standards. These provisions would guarantee full
retention of earnings, seniority rights, and benefits
for workers who must be removed from theirjobs to
protect their health. Such provisions are essential to
stimulate participation in medical exams, exams
which are necessary for the protection of the
worker's health. Two other provisions within Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Standards are impor-
tant with regards to hypersusceptible workers. Both
of these deal with the informational aspects of
health standards including access to information
and training. It is essential that all workers be
supplied with the results of environmental
monitoring and the results ofmedical exams with an
explanation of what those results mean to the indi-
vidual worker. It is essential that workers know
what levels of chemicals they are exposed to in the
workplace. Adequate information on the toxic ef-
fects of substances and the appropriate control
measures must be provided to individual workers.
Training and education programs must address the
hazards of toxic chemicals to all individuals, not
just hypersusceptible workers.
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HUGH EVANS (Brookl n Jeitwish Hospita,l): There are three
items I would like to bring up. As regards SAT and its applicabil-
ity to industrial screening, I would like to call the group's atten-
tion to a series of publications from Canada which appear in the
Amerinan Rei'iewr ofRespiratory Diseases ofApril '77 and April
'78 which are the annual numbers that include all the abstracts
that are submitted for presentation. You will see upon review of
these documents that there really is no clearcut basis for screen-
ing, particularly as regards the MZ phenotype. I think this is an
example, if I may say so, of the misapplication or at least the
premature application of a procedure. I was reassured in speak-
ing with Dr. Kilian that the Dow Company, which does do some
of the screening, does not in fact, utilize the data to exclude
individuals from any particular work situation, and I would urge
that we take a very restrained attitude. The second item was very
briefly alluded to at the end, and that is the absolute right of a
patient or a subject to all the information derived from any sort of
screening program. I found it rather disconcerting that an airline
pilot, at least according to one ofthe discussants (see comments
of Dr. Ashford), was not informed about a potentially lethal dis-
ease. Even if it had not been at that level of severity, I would
hope that in June of 1978 that would not occur or from here on
out that it would not occur. The third item pertains to the philos-
ophy of the entire discussion this afternoon and some of the
discussion this morning. I find it interesting that the whole crux
seems to be in the area of physical disorder, physical disease. I
get the impression that the beneficiaries, so to speak, of our
concern are people working on assembly lines, people who are in
the United Auto Workers, and Aluminum Workers, people in
copper smelting and the like. I was wondering ifeither in terms of
philosophy or implementation the concern ought not to include
the white collar workers. Does it include or should it include
government employees, the government itself being one of the
largest employers in the United States? Does it include the health
care industry, which is the fourth largest employer in the United
States. In general, I wonder who sets the standards for those who
set the standards. How did this all come about? If it is in the
realm of normative political judgment to be concerned about
hourly rated workers, is it not equally pertinent to be concerned
about their employers. Who is interested in the health standards
of the professors of pediatrics, for example, or the representa-
tives who are sitting up at the table. I was pleased to hear that the
Alcoa Corporation is in favor ofat least two items in the oldest of
texts; somewhere between these two there is a question of who
watches the watchman and really this is what I'm asking.
MORTON CORN. I think it's quite clear under our system of
regulation the legal authority for such action lies with the Sec-
retary of Labor, who has transferred authority to the Assistant
Secretary of Labor for OSHA. That organization is currently
staffed at somewhere in the neighborhood of 2700 persons. It is
incumbent upon the Assistant Secretary ofLabor to set priorities
and within the context of the United States problems, priorities
for psychological and mental stress of white collar workers have
been relatively low on the list. My reading of the Act suggests
that authority is there as you know, other nations in the world
have assigned a high priority to psychological stress on the job.
But insofar as the regulatory apparatus is concerned, it has not
been factored in, but it could be regulated at a future date.
This gives me an opportunity to respond to Peggy Seminario's
point ofwho makes thejudgments. Our system is also quite clear
on that. The first judgments, the initial judgments, are made by
the Assistant Secretary of Labor. Subsequent judgments are
made by individuals who do not like thatjudgment and utilize the
courts to reverse it. That is a unique and strong feature of our
system of government. The courts are a very potent factor for
social change and in our field they have been used in that way to
either prevent social change or to promote it in a direction dif-
fering from that which the regulator charged with authority has
decided to go. For example, the administrator ofOSHA utilized
the wisdom ofthe Congress to enter premises for inspections and
Mr. Barlow did not like that. Mr. Barlow took the right ofentry
without search warrant issue to the courts and won his case in
the Supreme Court. We should not minimize the power of soci-
ety, through third person review, to alter the judgment of those
charged through our representative government with the initial
judgmental factors.
There was a question on my overseas comment in the previous
discussion. Let me elucidate this. We have many students from
other countries, many ofthem now physicians ofgreat responsi-
bility. They adopt en masse the OSHA standards and the TLVs
and they can't enforce them, they can't implement them. The
standards are on the books in a country like Peru, with a 25%
prevalence figure for silicosis among miners. They have our
standard for free silica in air. It was that rapid incorporation of
our standards for purposes of respectability, without a realistic
judgment ofwhat is achieveable in those countries, that destroys
the credibility of their own agencies. I was not speaking against
standards in those countries, but it is perfectly conceivable to me
that Peru is going to have to walk before it runs with respect to
control offree silica. Peru will experience an incremental process
oflowering its standards as it gets on top ofthe problem. Many of
the developing nations ofAfrica, I am told, are adopting all ofour
standards. Many African nations do not know how to measure
the agents they are adopting standards to regulate. I was refer-
ring to this phenomenon in my remarks, not to an absence of
standards.
As to third point, what is safe? That is a societal judgment. I
personally disagree with many societal judgments. I'm very
fearful ofdriving during rush hour and do my best to avoid ever
getting in a car during rush hour, but society has judged the
injury and death tolls on our roads to be an acceptable price to
pay for our transportation. I try to minimize my exposure by
driving during the periods of lower risk. So the judgments are
made in that case, by our regulator through the traffic associa-
tion, and the individual has a right to minimize the risk from the
societaljudgment, but I am by no means advocating we all agree
with the societal judgment.
MICHAEL WRIGHT (United Steel Workers of America): I
have just a couple of comments. One is stimulated by what Dr.
Corn just said. I think it's a misstatement to say that many
foreign operations, especially mines in Latin America, cannot
meet United States standards. I think it is more accurate to say
that they are not interested in meeting United States standards.
Certainly the technology is available, certainly the profits are
immense from those operations, and certainly controls can be
installed by the ownership. In fact, many of those owners are
U. S. corporations.
Second, let me say that I found the panelists' comments on
risk-benefit analysis interesting and provocative, but somewhat
off the point of what we were supposed to discuss, which was
high risk groups and occupational standards. There's a position
on one side where we say we '"protect everybody,'" on the other
side where we say "identify and screen out hypersusceptible
workers and don't worry about protecting them, because they're
no longer in the work population." Where do you draw the line?
For people with Wilson's Disease, which has a prevalence of,
say, I in 200,000, I wouldn't have any trouble with keeping them
out of a copper smelter and I wouldn't say that the Federal
Standards for copper ought to be based on people with Wilson's
Disease. On the other hand, I think NIOSH has taken the posi-
tion that, in effect, the federal standard for carbon monoxide
should be based on those people with at least a degree of is-
chemic heart disease. There prevalence in the working popula-
tion is very high. It would be ineffective, unfair, and socially
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monoxide. The question is, where do you draw the line'? I think
we discussed that same point this morning. This morning we
were talking about whether a company should screen some
workers out'? This afternoon we were talking about whether
OSHA should screen them out by setting a standard that does not
protect them. Organized labor is very apprehensive of that kind
of screening, whether it's done by a company or through the use
of an OSHA standard. We would be much less apprehensive if
three conditions were met. Those three conditions are: first, the
screening must be accurate, valid, and must really identify high
risk groups. I haven't seen much evidence that this is true for
most of the genetic factors we discussed yesterday. The second
criterion is that a screening program must not be used to deny
protection to so-called "non-susceptibles." Every time we talk
about identifying a susceptible group we are in effect saying there
is another group which is 'nonsusceptible," or more accurately
"less susceptible." But they may still have appreciable risks.
Will a screening program be used as an excuse to avoid cleaning
up the workplace'? Finally, we must be willing to guarantee
employment to those workers who are screened out. Are we
willing to guarantee those people full earnings protection and
jobs'? And what about people not currently employed, but enter-
ing a pre-employment screening program. Are we willing to
guarantee those people equal access to job opportunities'?
So far, the evidence that industry and the government are
willing to do those things is not good. Until we see some evi-
dence that the screening programs are effective, that they will
not be used to deny "less susceptible" workers safe workplaces,
that people screened out will have full earnings protection and
equal access to jobs, we are going to resist these programs, and
rightly so.
BERTRAM DINMAN (Alcoa): First of all, I'll not respond in a
reverse fashion since the last question spoken to revolves about
the matter of rate retention. First of all, if I have a thousand
people in an audience, the odds are that there are going to be one
saint, 50 scoundrels, and the rest of the population's behavior
being somewere in between. Well, 50 scoundrels is about 5%: 1
guess what I'm saying is that there's going to be a total spectrum
of behavior across my total population sample. I would say the
same thing of any corporation. There are scoundrels and there
are saints. I would say the same thing about unions. There are
some scoundrels we all know and there are some saints. Now for
most ofthe people in between, I would only say that in collective
bargaining we have looked at the question of rate retention and
we jointly agreed with our unions that if an individual is
screended out ofthejob because ofsome change in the employee
which was a result of the job exposure we will agree to abide by
rate retention. They will not lose any money in terms of renum-
eration because of their being taken out. We agree that it's our
responsibility. Obviously I can speak only for Alcoa but that's
where we are. So one should not generalize and say that it's not
going to be done, because it is being done and right now. As for
protection of nonsusceptibles, I have no question about that.
There's no excuse for saying to the work force that since this
population probably does not contain susceptibles, we'll leave
the work place sloppy and a potential risk for every one ofthese
individuals. I don't think one has a license to pollute the work-
place on any grounds anyway.
As far as the effectiveness of screening, when I came to this
conference I thought perhaps the question might arise as to
G6PD possibilities or SAT possibilities. Yet I know that some
corporations who tried to do screening ofthe SAT factorfound it
to be totally nonproductive. What we're saying, in effect, is that
the number of individuals who possibly might be screened out
was so miniscule, if they existed at all, that the process was not
worthwhile. Ultimately, I find myself in a difficult position to
respond to the question: "'Do you have a policy?" How in the
blazes can I develop a policy for relatively few people. Policy, as
I understand it, is a process instituted for large numbers of indi-
viduals who may become involved in some question in order to
insure equity to the greater numbers of persons involved. Policy
should provide some consistent fashion for dealing with this
problem and the many people involved. If I have a few people
affected by a certain problem, however, I am not going to set up
policy, since I don't think that to try to force an individual into a
mold of a "policy" does that individualjustice, and it only inef-
fectively solves the problem.
Finally, as to the effectiveness of screening, I think the exam-
ple of CO and the latent heart disease which should be expected
in the male over45 is relevant. One should go back to the original
data upon which these screening responses are based. I refer to
the Aronow and to the Anderson studies: in both cases, the
precipitation of EKG changes and precipitation ofangina were in
patients who had clinically preexisting detectible angina. Now,
that is not very subtle screening. I wouldn't want to base any
determinations and standards upon such a population. I don't
think that such screenings are effective. I quite agree that there
are not many screening methods that we have which are effec-
tive. So to take action on that basis, I find to be an exercise in
futility at this point in time.
JONATHAN KING (MIT): I'm sure everybody's aware that
OSHA's trying to get generic standards for carcinogens. There
are hearings going on in Washington, and of course there has
been quite a lot of opposition to generic standards for carcino-
gens because for some people this would be quite expensive. It's
also true that one has heard the argument put forward, "Well,
there really are certain cancers that are due to genetic suscepti-
bility and it's not due to exposure to carcinogens." And those
arguments have been put out. Second, I'd like to take from my
own experience in certain controversial genetic screening issues,
in particular, the screening of newborn infants for an extra Y
chromosome to see if they grow up to be criminals. In numerous
cases where there was a scientific discussion but no data were
shown establishing the correlation. And then one would see three
months later the report, "Scientists Show Relationship Between
Chromosome and Criminality." I'm sure a number of us have
seen articles suggesting a genetic basis for susceptibility to dis-
ease which don't have such a base. Given the environment, I'd
like to propose a mild resolution on this for those of us here,
given that we are in the middle of the process of getting a stan-
dard for carcinogens. I resolve that as scientists and adminis-
trators concerned with protecting health we recognize the im-
portance of investigating susceptibility to pollutants within dif-
ferent occupational, social, and age groups. However, we want
to affirm the importance of lowering the exposure to noxious
materials to all members ofthe society, and to this end the efforts
of OSHA and EPA for developing generic standards for carcino-
gens and toxic substances. I think in this area we really are the
critical scientific population. If we very clearly support the ef-
forts of governmental agencies to lower exposure to toxic ma-
terials this could be significant.
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